It is no exaggeration to say that for two-thirds of the world’s population religion plays an inescapable role in both the private and the public lives. It is a factor in the world’s most significant conflicts, in many of the problems of the family and of society, in public policy, psychotherapy, and education. Totally secular approaches to these issues cannot do justice to the complexity of the matter; they can only treat religion as an alien element that has nothing to do with them.
Yet the definition of religion is in a state of constant flux. Originally a concept for scrupulous devotion, it has been retooled into a taxon of social practices that may or may not have gods at their core. It is a category-concept whose paradigmatic examples include Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Shinto, and so forth. It is also a functional concept that sorting social practices by the way they generate cohesion or provide orientation in life.
The problem with these different sorts of definitions is that what counts as a religion according to one definition can easily be excluded from the category by another. The result is that the use of the concept as a social taxon raises philosophical issues that are also relevant for other concepts used to classify cultural types, such as literature, democracy, or even “culture” itself.
A fundamental issue is whether a concept for a social kind can be said to have an essence. This question is raised because the development of a concept for a social kind depends on the fact that the phenomenon to be described has a defining property that makes it distinct from other phenomena with which it can be compared and classified.
This is why it is common today to see scholars adopting what are called “monothetic-set” definitions of religion. These take the classical view that a concept will accurately describe a particular phenomenon, and they define religion by its ability to create solidarity or give direction in life. They also assume that every phenomenon that fits the definition will have this defining property.
There are, however, critics of this approach. They call it a “stipulative” definition and argue that it forces scholars to accept whatever the definition is, and thus to avoid critical examination of the phenomenon itself. Moreover, they point out that the fact that what is counted as religion shifts according to one’s definition reveals that the concept is an abstract tool that has been invented at some time and place and imposed on others.
The debate over the nature of the concept of religion is a central one in social science and in the humanities. Ultimately, it affects how the concept is used in the practice of religion and the study of religion. If we can clarify the underlying philosophical issues, we can develop more useful ways to think about these important phenomena. We can then better understand the complexities of their existence and influence, and make more effective choices about how to treat them.